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COVENANT NOT TO SUE HELD DEFENSE RATHER THAN
COUNTERCLAIM
Johnson v. Sargent
109 Ohio App. 16, 163 N.E.2d 401 (1960)
At the scene of an automobile accident in Nebraska, the parties to this
action entered into an oral contract,' each agreeing not to report his damages
to his insurance company and to pay for the repairs to his own automobile.
Despite this contract, plaintiff later obtained a default judgment in Nebraska
for the damages to his automobile. The noted decision arose out of plaintiff's
suit in Ohio on the Nebraska judgment, in which defendant filed a cross-
petition for damages arising from plaintiff's breach of the oral contract.
Plaintiff's motion to strike the cross-petition was treated as a demurrer and
sustained.2 The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the oral contract
was "strictly defensive" matter which the defendant had waived by failing
to assert it in the Nebraska action.3
In finding that the contract offered by defendant was strictly a matter
of defense, the court relied heavily on the opinion in Rothman v. Engel.4
In that case, plaintiff had recovered a judgment for breach of contract;
defendant brought a subsequent action to have the judgment set aside on
grounds that the contract had been induced by fraudulent misrepresentation.
The court concluded that fraud was strictly a matter of defense and as such
could not be asserted in a separate action.5 In applying this language to the
instant case, the court seems to have overlooked the implication that fraud
is not properly asserted as a counterclaim.0
The instant case also ignores the Ohio Supreme Court decision in
Witte v. Lockwood,7 cited in the Rothman case as holding that the general
rule that defenses not pleaded are waived is not applicable where the matter
constituting the defense is sufficient to constitute a counterclaim.8
The instant opinion is confined in its construction of the Ohio counter-
1 In Ohio this contract would probably be equivalent to mutual covenants not
to sue which is an agreement not to enforce a cause of action which has already arisen.
Meyers v. Jenkins, 63 Ohio St. 101, 120, 57 N.E. 1089, 1093 (1900).
2 This is not an uncommon practice in Ohio as illustrated in Hayman v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 77 Ohio App. 135, 139, 62 N.E.2d 724, 727 (1945).
3 Johnson v. Sargent, 109 Ohio App. 16, 163 N.E.2d 401 (1960).
4 Rothman v. Engel, 97 Ohio St. 77, 119 N.E. 250 (1917).
G Ibid. at 79, at 80 ". . . Our code requires the defendant to set forth all of his
strictly legal defenses to a suit brought against him, or be forever barred from urging
one of them in a second suit between the same parties touching the same subject
matter."
6 Supra, note 4, at 81 "... It furnished no basis for a counterclaim of such
character as could be reserved for future action. It was purely and strictly defensive."
7 Witte v. Lockwood, 39 Ohio St. 141 (1883).
s Ibid. The syllabus reads, "The general rule is that a defendant is bound to set
up every defense, legal or equitable or both, which he may have to the action, and
waives those not pleaded; but where the facts claimed to afford a defense are sufficient
to constitute a counter-claim, there is an exception to such general rule."
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claim statute9 to the portion which permits counterclaims "ascertained by
the decision of the court." The court disallowed defendant's claim under this
section by construing it to refer not to plaintiff's cause of action which had
been ascertained by the Nebraska court, but only to such cause of action
as defendant might assert by virtue of a judgment previously awarded to
him.10
One must assume that the court was asked to determine the validity
of defendant's counterclaim only under this limited section, without refer-
ence to the other provisions for counterclaims afforded by the Ohio statute.
Defendant's claim seems more appropriate when considered in light of the
section allowing a counterclaim arising out of "a cause of action set forth
in the petition as the foundation of the petition or the foundation of the
plaintiff's claim, or connected with the subject of the action or arising out
of contract. . .. ,'l The assertion of the contract on which defendant's
action for breach is based and its connection with the subject matter of
plaintiff's action (a judgment awarded in the action which occasioned the
breach), would seem clearly to constitute a valid counterclaim under even
the strictest construction of this statutory language,1 2 and entitle defendant
to a decision on the merits of his claim.
Neither Ohio nor Nebraska have compulsory counterclaim statutes 3
and the only penalty for not filing a counterclaim in the initial suit is the
inability to recover costs in a subsequent action.14 An independent cause
of action existing in the defendant for plaintiff's breach of contract, which
arose when plaintiff violated his promise not to sue by bringing the Nebraska
action,15 should be allowed as a counterclaim under the Ohio law in the Ohio
court when plaintiff sues on the very judgment which provides the measure
of defendant's damages. 16
David G. Hill
9 Ohio Rev. Code § 2309.16 (1957). "A counterclaim is a cause of action existing
in favor of one or more defendants against one or more plaintiffs or . . . defendants,
or both, . . . arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in the petition as the
foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or connected with the subject of the action or
arising out of contract or ascertained by the decision of the court."
1o Supra note 3, at 19.
11 Supra note 9.
12 Braden v. Neubrander, 89 Ohio App. 295, 101 N.E.2d 789 (1951), illustrates
that the Ohio courts have in fact been very liberal in allowing counterclaims based on
breach of contract.
'3 Home v. Woolever, 170 Ohio St. 178, 163 N.E.2d 378 (1959), held that a
claim not brought in an original action in federal court, under the federal compulsory
counterclaim statute, was res judicata in the Ohio courts, supra p. 251.
14 Lyons v. Garnette, 88 Ohio App. 543, 98 N.E.2d 346 (1950); Ohio Rev. Code
§ 2323.40 (1953); Neb. Rev. Stat. ch. 25, § 814 (1943).
15 National City Bank v. Erskine & Sons, Inc., 158 Ohio St. 450, 110 N.E.2d 598
(1953).
10 Portsmouth Clay Products Co. v. Russell, 10 Ohio L. Abs. 464 (Ct. App. 1931);
Prosser, Torts § 46 (2d ed. 1955). Under a covenant not to sue, "the plaintiff does
not surrender his cause of action, but merely agrees that he will not enforce it, and
becomes liable for an equivalent amount of damages if he does."
